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Plural Reference is the view that definite plural NPs such as the children refer to several individuals at once, rather than referring to a single entity, a plurality, sum, or collection consisting of individuals, the view that can be called ‘Reference to a Plurality’. Plural Reference has been pursued with considerable interest by philosophical logicians. This book will defend Plural Reference and apply it to a range of natural language phenomena that semanticists to an extent have described in terms of the more standard view of Reference to a Plurality (including my own version of it in Moltmann 1997, 1998, 2006). This book will also develop a connection between Plural Reference and Alternative Semantics, the view that at least certain expressions or sentences have several semantic values at once, as well as Truthmaker Semantics, the view, roughly, that the semantic value of sentences consist of a set of truth-making situations. It will apply both approaches to a compositional semantics of coordinate sentences based on a three-dimensional syntactic theory of coordination in the sense of Goodall (1985), Muadz (1991) and Moltmann (21992). In particular, the book will develop a compositional semantics based on Plural Reference (and an extension of it) for conjunctive sentences and Alternative Semantics for disjunctive sentences, given three-dimensional syntactic structures of such sentences.





There are two distinct ways of thinking about plural terms. One view, Plural Reference, is the view that a definite plural NP refers to several individuals at once, rather than referring to an entity that is a plurality (a sum or collection of individuals). Thus, the children refers to each child at once, rather than referring to a single collection consisting of the individual children. Plural Reference has been pursued mainly by philosophical logicians (Boolos 1984, 1984, Oliver/Smiley 2004, 2006, Yi 2005, 2006, Linnebo 2012, Rayo 2006, McKay 2006) 
(and appears to go back as far as Plato). Plural Reference contrasts with Reference to Plurality, the view that definite plurals stand for single collective entities, such as mereological sums or sets. Reference to a Plurality clearly has become the standard view in linguistic semantics (Link 1983, 1984, Landman 1989, Lasersohn 1995, Ojeda 1993, Schwarzschild 1996, Moltmann 1997) (with Schein 1995 being an exception). It is a view that receives intuitive support from apparent parallels between singular count, mass, and plural NPs and has been applied to a great range of linguistic phenomena, including distributivity and plural quantifiers and plural-related adverbials of various sorts. By contrast, Plural Reference has hardly been explored for the range of linguistic phenomena in natural language that involve plurals. One aim of this book is to show how the various linguistic phenomena involving plurals can be accounted for within Plural Reference and moreover that there are a number of reasons to prefer Plural Reference over Reference to a Plurality. 
     A special case of a plural term is an NP coordinated with and, such as John and Mary. One important view about coordination, explored by Goodall (1985), Muadz (1991)  and myself (Moltmann 1992), is that coordination involves a three-dimensional syntactic structure in which different conjuncts or disjuncts are not ordered with respect to each other, but belong to different ‘planes’.  It appears that Plural Reference provides the ‘literal’ interpretation of conjoined NPs on a three-dimensional analysis. That is, John and Mary is interpreted as referring to John and Mary at once simply by assigning the NP the interpretations of both of its planes at once. In order to deal with coordination of expressions other than referential NPs (such as conjunctions of adjectives or verbs), it will generalize plural reference to multiple applications of semantic operations at once.
     Plural reference does not as such apply to disjunction, but here Alternative Semantics comes into play. Given Alternative Semantics (Aloni 2007), disjunctions have several semantic values at once.  Alternative semantics then provides a literal interpretation of the three-dimensional syntactic structure of disjunctive sentences: each plane is assigned an alternative, and the alternatives together make up the meaning of the disjunction. Plural reference and alternative semantics pose the same sorts of challenges to compositional semantics, requiring either pointwise applications of semantic operations (Ciardelli et al.) or else plural application of semantics operations, applications of a semantic operation to several objects at once (Oliver / Smiley 2015).

Chapter 1
 Reference to Pluralities and Plural Reference

Reference to a Plurality at first sight has significant appeal given a range of parallels between singular count, mass, and plural NPs. Such parallels motivate the view that definite NPs of all three categories stand for single entities: individuals, pluralities, or quantities (Moltmann 1997, Chap. 1). Besides definite NPs themselves (Sharvy 1980), one construction that displays such a parallel particularly well is the partitive construction below:

(1) a. all of the house
      b. all of the children
      c. all of the wood

All in (1) appears to range of whatever counts as the parts of the referent of the definite NP, ‘the house’, ‘the children’, or ‘the wood’. Thus individuals, pluralities, and quantities appear to be treated on a par, as entities that all come with a part-whole structure. 
      Also adverbial part-related modifiers such as partly or to some extent make the point:

(2) a. The house is partly / to some extent white.
      b. The people are partly / to some extent French.
      c. The wood is partly / to some extent dry.

Partly and to some extent, it appears, treat individuals, pluralities, or quantities on a par, as having a part-whole structure.
     A common way of conceiving of the part relation applied to pluralities and quantities is that of extensional mereology (Link 1984). In linguistic semantics (in the tradition Link 1984), extensional mereology has been restricted to the semantic values of plurals and mass NPs, and does not necessarily extend to the part-whole structure of ordinary objects. 
        My previous approach in Moltmann (1997, 1998, 2006), by contrast, assumes that there is a single part relation applying to individuals, pluralities, and quantities, governed by general conditions that involve the notion of an integrated whole. The notion of an integrated whole (which was adopted from Simons 1987) includes properties of shape or having a boundary or simply of being a maximal entity consisting of objects that stand in a particular relation or share a particular property. Conditions of integrity, so the assumption, may block the transitivity of the part relation, whether it applies to individuals, pluralities, or quantities (that is, the inference from x < y and y < z to x < z is valid only if y is not an integrated whole). Moreover, conditions of integrity restrict sum formation (that is, sums of individuals exist only if they integrated wholes). The only special assumption about plural and mass NPs that was made was that with them integrity conditions are generally restricted to the information content of the NP used as well as perhaps information coming from the nonlinguistic context. This requires a relativization of integrity conditions and thus the part-whole structure of pluralities and quantities to situations, in particular the information content of a reference situation associated with the utterance of an NP (where a reference situation roughly corresponds to the notion of a resource situation in Barwise / Perry 1983). Let me call this way of treating pluralities the situation-based ontological account of pluralities.
     There are serious problems for the situation-based ontological account of pluralities, though (Moltmann 2016). They involve particular difficulties concerning the role of information-based integrity conditions in Moltmann (1997) (pointed out by Pianesi 2002 and addressed in Chapter 2). Moreover, and most importantly, they involve the fact that it is a Reference to a Plurality approach.
     Natural language poses serious challenges for the view that pluralities are on a par with individuals. Pluralities are simply never treated as ‘single’ entities or as particular types of entities (Moltmann 2016). They are always treated as ‘multitudes’ -- or ‘classes as many’ rather than ‘classes as one’ (to use Russell’s terminology). This intuition manifests itself particularly well in the application of number-related predicates, such as count, be numerous, enumerate, name, count, and numerals:

(3) a. John counted the nine people.
      b. The stones are numerous.
      c. The students are twenty in number.
(4) a. John enumerated the students.
      b. John named the students.

Number-related predicates can never target the entire plurality as ‘one’. Thus, (3a) cannot possibly understood as ‘John counted ‘one’’. Moreover, number-related predicates cannot target relevant sub-pluralities, unlike what I will call part-related predicates such as compare or separate. Thus, (5a) can have a reading on which John compared the plurality of female students to the plurality of male students, and (5b) can have a reading on which John separated the male students from the female students:

(5) a. John compared the students.
     b. John separated the students.

Part-related predicates may target sub-pluralities of a plurality rather than their individual members. This also holds for the part-related semantic operations that are involved in the interpretation of similar/ different, distributivity, reciprocals, and the partitive construction.
   That number-related predicates may target only individuals and not the entire plurality or subpluralities is a serious problem for Reference to a Plurality. Given Reference to a Plurality, the entire plurality and the contextually relevant sub-pluralities that part-related predicates may target generally are assigned the very same ontological status as individuals. Thus, they should count as ‘one’ rather than as ‘many’. The problem is a central one for Reference to a Plurality, which treats pluralities as single entities, and it motivates conceiving of pluralities as ‘many’, rather than as single collective entities. The difference between number-related predicates and part-related predicates simply shows that some predicates are sensitive to the fundamental distinction between ‘one’ and ‘many’, whereas others are not.
     There is a potential strategy of avoiding the problem, certainly implicitly relied upon in some of the work based on Reference on a Plurality. This strategy consists in drawing a fundamental distinction between the conception of the semantic value assigned to definite plurals in the semantic theory and the use of plural terms and predicates in the metalanguage. Thus, definite plurals may be assigned single entities as semantic values without this meaning that plurals refer to ‘one thing’ and that number related predicates apply to those semantic values as ‘individual entities’. I will argue that this strategy is problematic. It goes against important general conditions on a semantic theory, namely that the object language be included in the metalanguage. This is reflected in the disquotational axioms of Davidson’s (1984) theory of meaning as a Tarski-style truth theory, as well as Horwich’s deflationist account of meaning (Horwich (1990, 1998), which posits (6) as a condition on the application of predicates:

(6) (y)(F is true of y ↔ Fy)

     There is an alternative interpretation of that strategy, though, and that is that the strategy treats definite plurals not as referential NPs, but as non-referential terms, terms whose function is not to provide the arguments of predicates but to combine compositionally with the denotation of the predicate to give the overall truth conditions of the sentence. Then (6) would not be applicable. The problem, however is that whatever criteria one adopts for referential terms (their behavior with respect to identity predicates or quantifiers, let’s say), if definite singular NPs in argument position are referential terms, then so are definite plurals.

Structure of Chapter 1
1. Plural Reference and Reference to a Plurality – historical and more recent traditions
2. The main arguments for Plural Reference
    2.1. Logical arguments
    2.2. Arguments from the application of numerical predicates
3. Apparent equivalence of Plural Reference and Reference to a Plurality
  3.1. Semantic values vs referential values in semantics




Plural Reference in the Context of Natural Language

This chapter will focus on particular linguistic phenomena that I will argue support an account based on Plural Reference, namely:
[1] a restriction of certain types of predicates and semantic operations to plural arguments
[2] readings of predicates or semantic operations that target the division of a plurality into subpluralities.
This chapter will also discuss how Plural Reference will account for some serious problems that arise for the situation-based ontological account of pluralities of Moltmann (1997), to an extent pointed out by Pianesi (2002). The chapter will be based on Moltmann (2016).
      One general problem for Reference to a Plurality is a certain requirement imposed by particular types of predicates or semantic operations. This requirement is called the Accessibility Requirement in Moltmann (1997). It consists in that predicates or readings of predicates whose meaning involves reference to the parts but not the whole of an argument can apply only to plurals. The requirement concerns predicates such as compare and distinguish (on an internal reading) as in (7, 8), but also semantic operations as are involved in distributive readings, as in (9), as well as the interpretation of reciprocals as in (10) and the internal of reading of same/different as in (11): 

(7) a. John compared the class.
     b. John compared the students
(8) a. John cannot distinguish the class.
      b. John cannot distinguish the students.
(9) a. John evaluated the class.
      b. John evaluated the students
(10) a. The class likes each other.
       b. The students like each other.
(11) a. The class watched the same movie. 
       b. The students watched the same movie.

Given Reference to a Plurality, the requirement has to be considered a sortal restriction of particular predicates (or rather predicate argument positions) to certain types of entities or to entities that have certain properties in the situation of reference (Moltmann 1997). On the extensional mereological account, the requirement would consist in that certain predicates or readings of predicates do not take ‘atoms’ as arguments, but only proper sums. On the situation-based ontological account, the requirement consists in that certain predicates or readings of predicates are inapplicable to integrated wholes in the reference situation (the assumption being that referents of singular count NPs always are integrated wholes, at least in the situation of reference, where pluralities are not or only to a ‘low’ degree).  
     The problem is that the Accessibility Requirement does not behave like a sortal restriction (or semantic selectional requirement). Standard cases of sortal restrictions characteristically allow for coercion or type shift, the mapping of an object of reference not meeting the restriction to a closely related one meeting it. (12b) and (13b), for example, involve type shift of an object (which is not what the predicate selects) to a suitable event involving the object (which is what the predicate selects):

(12) a. John started reading the book.
       b. John started the book.
(13) a. John proposed a movie.
       b. John proposed watching a movie.

With predicates subject to the Accessibility Requirement, by contrast, coercion is completely impossible. No effort of coercion can make the examples in (7a, 8a, 9a, 10a, 11a) acceptable on an internal reading, and that even though coercion would simply involve mapping a collective object to the plurality of entities constituting it. 
      Plural Reference provides a straightforward way of understanding the Accessibility Requirement that would not predict coercion. Given Plural Reference, definite plural NPs and definite singular count NPs differ not in what they refer to, but in how they refer. A singular definite refers to a single individual, whereas a plural definite refers to several individuals at once. Given Plural Reference, the Accessibility Requirement will simply be a condition on which argument places of predicates of a certain sort will be plural argument places. That is, a predicate or semantic operation making reference to the parts, but not the whole of an argument has to apply to several individuals at once to allow for the sentence to be true. 
   Another major problem for Reference to a Plurality concerns the treatment of higher-level pluralities. This is the phenomenon that predicates or semantic operations target not individual members of a plurality, but subdivisions of a plurality into subpluralities. Such readings arise with part-related predicates as well as part-related semantic operations, as are involved in distributive interpretation, reciprocals, and the internal reading of same/different. The examples below naturally display readings involving the two pluralities that the plural definite conjuncts refer to:

(14) a. John compared the boys and the girls.
       b. John evaluated the boys and the girls.
       c. The boys and the girls hate each other.
       d. The boys and the girls saw different movies.

Reference to a Plurality has two assume that in (14a-d) the plurality has two distinguished parts; the maximal plurality of boys and the maximal plurality of girls. Given the extensional mereological account, those two pluralities will have to count as atoms (Link 1984). In Moltmann (1997), I proposed that only the maximal plurality of boys and the maximal plurality of girls form sums in the situation of reference, whereas other pluralities of boys and girls do not. This is because only the former are integrated wholes in the reference situation, namely in virtue of being maximal pluralities whose members share a property conveyed by the NP used (the property or being a boy/girl).
      The problem is that on either account the two distinguished parts, the plurality of the boys and the plurality of the girls, count as ‘one’. This is just as problematic as treating the entire plurality as a single entity. Parts of a plurality that are themselves pluralities are never treated as ‘one’, but always as ‘many’. Number-related predicate may never target pluralities, but only individuals.
     Higher-level plurality readings are available also with simple definite plurals, as already in (5a, b). Thus the same readings as in (14) are available when replacing the boys and the girls by the children, in a suitable context. Whereas the situation-based account of Moltmann (1997) would say that in such cases the division of the plurality is driven by implicit contextual information, other accounts based on Reference to a Plurality impose no constraints whatsoever on what may count as the relevant parts of the plurality in the context (Gillon 1987, Schwarzschild 1995). I will call this the contextual account of higher-level pluralities.
     It appears that neither the situation-based ontological account of higher-level pluralities in Moltmann (1997) nor the contextual account can be correct. The phenomenon of higher-level pluralities is considerably more structure-driven than the situation-based ontological account or the contextual account would have it. Higher-level plurality readings are straightforwardly available only if the relevant subpluralities are the semantic values of different NPs that form the conjuncts of a conjunctive NP. The mere information content of an NP is not enough. Thus, a higher-level plurality reading on which John compared the boys to the girls is much less easily available in (15):

(15) John compared the boys and girls.

(15) allows equally well for a reading on which John compared one group of boys and girls to another group of boys and girls, not respecting maximality. Such a reading is hardly available in (14a).
     In addition , the situation-based ontological account faces the difficulty that it must consider maximal pluralities whose member share a property integrated wholes for the purpose of blocking transitivity (allowing them to be the only parts of a plurality in the reference situation), but not for the purpose of violating the Accessibility Requirement (Pianesi 2002).
   An even more serious problem for the situation-based ontological account is that a higher-level plurality reading is easily available with a conjunction of existentially quantified NPs which would not guarantee maximality for defining subpluralities as integrated wholes:

(16) a. John compared some boys and some girls.
       b. John evaluated some boys and some girls.

This means that the unity induced by the use of a single plural term or variable takes priority over any conditions of unity induced by lexical content or contextual information.
     The structure-drivenness of sub-pluralities would be accounted for if the relevant predicates are considered multigrade predicates rather than plural predicates. Thus, compare would be a multigrade predicate in its second place (linked to the object position) (Oliver/Smiley 2006). Treating compare in (16a) as a multigrade predicate would go along with an analysis of the complement the boys and the girls as a list of two pluralities, the plurality of boys and the plurality of girls. Let me call this the multigrade-predicate account of higher-level plurality.
     It not as such implausible that compare is a multigrade predicate. English clearly has multigrade predicates, for example add:

(17) John added two and two and two.

In general, the multigrade position does not require a conjunction of NPs but also accepts a simple definite plural, as with add and compare below:

(18) a. John added the numbers.
        b. John compared the numbers.

Moreover, multigrade predicates generally come with a relational variant, as is the case with both add and compare:

(19) a. John added one to two.
       b. John compared the men to the women.

     However, the multigrade-predicate account cannot cover the full range of cases giving rise to higher-level plurality. Higher-level pluralities may be involved in distributive interpretations of predicates as well as the interpretation of reciprocals and same/different, as in (14b, c, d).
       The multigrade-predicate account moreover could not apply to cases of third-level pluralities:

(20) The daughters and the mothers and the sons and the fathers have similar problems with 
        each other.

On the relevant reading, (20) states the similarity between mother-daughter problems and father-son problems. 
     Furthermore, the multigrade-predicate account has difficulties dealing with modifiers like individual. In Moltmann (2006), individual (as in John compared the individual students) was analysed as an expression imposing a condition on pluralities in reference situations, namely to have only individuals as situated parts. This ensures that in the presence of the modifier individual predicates and semantic operations can target only individuals as parts of a plurality. The multigrade-predicate account can hardly deal with the semantic contribution of expressions of this sort. Thus, treating higher-level pluralities as involving a division of a plurality into subpluralities in the relevant situation appears unavoidable. 
      There is a general difficulty even for such an approach, though, and that is the possibility of using definite plurals attributively, as below:

(21) In his new role, John has to compare the boys and girls of this school over the years.

Such a reading is available also in a suitable context in which the relevant subpluralities are not explicitly described by different conjuncts:

(22) John has to compare male students and female student in this school. His task is to 
        make comparative evaluations of the students over several years. 

This problem, which recalls the possibility of using incomplete singular descriptions attributively (Soames 1986), has so far been ignored in the semantic literature on plurals.
      The approach to higher-level plurality that I will develop will involve a relativization of plural terms to a situation of reference now conceived in a different way. A reference situation on that view need not include a particular domain of entities, but may just consist in a set of properties constitutive of the unity of subpluralities in particular circumstances of evaluation. Such unity-constituting conditions may include the property of being a maximal plurality of individuals that are semantic values of the same plural term or variable as part of a complex plural term. Conditions of unity will be the basis for a division of a plurality into subpluralities in the relevant situation, without defining those subpluralities as single entities. Unity-constituting conditions based on the expressions used will become obligatorily part of the reference situation. In addition, a reference situation will contain conditions of unity based on relevant properties that the speaker may have in mind. Such conditions may, but need not be indicated by the information content of the NP used. They depend directly only on the speaker’s intentions. In the case of a referentially used plural term, the reference situation will contain a particular domain of individuals as well as possibly a set of unity-constituting conditions. In the case of an attributively used plural term, it will contain only a set of unity-constituting conditions. Part-related predicates and semantic operations will apply to pluralities only relative to a situation of reference in a context of evaluation.
     The chapter will also discuss other cases of a sensitivity of a predicate to reference situations besides plural predicates. For example, predicates of description need to be understood relative to the way an entity is described. Thus, ‘a book’ is an answer to a request ‘describe the object!’, but not to the request ‘describe the book!’ even if the object and the book refer to the very same thing.
     By positing unity-constituting conditions for subpluralities as components of reference situations, the account avoids imposing general conditions on the part relation or a plural-specific part relation. For example, the account need not state any condition on the transitivity of the part relation as such (thus avoiding the rather unsatisfactory condition stated in Moltmann (1997) (cf.  Pianesi 2002). Unity-constituting condition determine what the relevant ‘parts’ of a plurality in a reference situation are, but pluralities as many are not themselves subject to laws of mereology. Moreover, the account avoids treating pluralities or subpluralities in any way as single entities, even if they fulfil unity-constituting conditions.
     Pluralities in reference situations and individuals may share certain analogies and the same (polysemous) expression may pick out their respective ‘parts’ (such as the partitive construction). But only individuals are subject to conditions of ontology; pluralities as the semantic values of plural terms are instead subject to conditions associated with the use of plural terms.
    Plural Reference may also shed a new light on the class of predicates that resist any collective interpretation with plurals (but not collective NPs), such as predicates of shape and size (Moltmann 2006, Schwarzschild 2009):

(23) a. The group of children is large.
        b. The children are large.

Given Plural Reference it is not expected that predicates that apply to individuals also apply with the same meaning to pluralities, unlike an approach that considers pluralities entities of a particular sort. This means that predicates of shape and size can be considered the norm rather than the exception. Given Plural Reference, it is plausible that distributive interpretation take priority and collective interpretations of predicates are derivative. For example in the case of eventive predicates displaying collective readings, they may be based on relations of individual participation in a collective event. This chapter will explore an account according to which collective interpretations arise as derivative lexical meanings of certain types of predicates (which do not include predicates of size and shape) and are not generally available.
     This chapter will also discuss, though somewhat briefly, the mass-count distinction and the way Plural Reference may or may not apply to mass nouns. Like pluralities, the quantities that definite mass NPs refer to never count as ‘one’. I will review the ways discussed in Moltmann (1997, 2006) of how mass NPs may obtain the semantic status of plurals with certain modifiers, for example plural possessives, as in the jewelry of the different women. I will argue that, as in the case of plural terms, such modifiers provide unity-constituting conditions, but without defining subquantities as single entities.

Structure of Chapter 2
1. Plural Reference in the context of natural language
    1.1. Plural definite descriptions and functors
    1.2. Plural predicates: distributive and collective interpretations
    1.3. Multigrade predicates 
2. The Accessibility Requirement or Plurality Constraint
    2.1. Predicates and semantic operations subject to the Accessibility Requirement
    2.2. The Accessibility Requirement as a constraint on plural predicates and plural functions 
    2.3. Strictly distributive predicates on a Plural Reference view
3. Definite plurals and higher-level pluralities
    3.1. Distributive readings and part-structure-sensitive semantic selection
    3.2. Constraints on relevant divisions of pluralities
    3.3. The multigrade-predicate account and its problems
    3.4. A situated plural-reference account 
    3.5. Other cases of a sensitivity of predicates to reference situations 
4. The mass-count distinction
   4.1. Approaches to the mass-count distinction




Plural Reference, Alternative Semantics, and Three-Dimensional Syntactic Structures

This chapter will give a new interpretation of three-dimensional syntactic structures of coordinate sentences based on plural reference. 
     The central assumption of three-dimensional syntactic analyses of coordinate sentences is that the constituents that are coordinated are not linearly ordered, at least not until the level of Phonetic Form. Rather they form different planes in a three-dimensional syntactic tree. Thus, in the NP John, Mary, and Sue, John, Mary and Sue will be on different planes, though all dominated by the same DP node. Three-dimensional syntactic analyses of coordination have been motivated by various syntactic phenomena peculiar to coordination, such as ATB extraction, Right Node Raising, and Gapping (Goodall 1985, Muadz 1991, Moltmann 1992). The main idea of such analyses is that while movement may apply to the various planes of a three-dimensional syntactic structure at once (leading to a shared node), syntactic rules and conditions apply to each plane individually. That is, standard syntax applies to individual planes, whereas coordination-specific syntactic rules apply to three-dimensional syntactic structures as such. 
      This chapter will explore a novel interpretation of three-dimensional syntactic structures of coordination based on both Plural Reference (for conjunctions) and Alternative Semantics (for disjunctions). 
       The chapter will resume the three-dimensional analysis of coordinate structures of Moltmann (1992) and give it a new interpretation in terms of plural reference. The analysis of Moltmann (1992) was designed in particular in order to deal with the semantics of expressions or constructions requiring plural antecedents in coordinate sentences containing only singular NPs such as (24a-d) below:

(24) a. John came and Mary left without PRO talking to each other.
       b. On the same day John watched a movie and Mary a game.
       c. A man entered and a woman left that had never met before.
       d. The man and the woman who live in the same building like each other.

Given a three-dimensional syntactic structure, John and Mary in (24a) occupy separate planes (containing John came and Mary left respectively). This allows John and Mary to be implicitly coordinated, which means John and Mary are dominated by the same NP-node. Similarly, came and left in (24a) are implicitly coordinated, dominated by the same V-node. Three-dimensional syntactic structures with implicit coordination require a rather complex compositional analysis. They involve two sorts of logical forms at once, which will form the basis of two partial interpretations that are later unified to form the complete meaning of the sentence. One logical form (LF1) will be based on the explicit coordination ‘John came and Mary left’: the other (LF2) will be based on the implicit coordination ‘John (and) Mary came (and) left without PRO talking to each other’. LF2 will be the basis for the interpretation of the coordinated NPs as a plural NP referring to the plurality of the semantic values of the singular NPs. This plurality will provide the semantic antecedent of PRO and each other. The implicit coordination of came and left will describe the plurality of events of coming and leaving. The interpretation of LF2 neglects the association of John with the coming and Mary with the leaving, but only cares about the two being involved in a complex event of coming and leaving while not talking to each other. The interpretation of LF1 takes care of the association of John with the coming and Mary with the leaving, but disregards the contribution of the expression requiring a plural antecedent, without talking to each other. The combination of the interpretations of LF1 and of LF2 yields the complete meaning of the sentence.
     The re-interpretation of three-dimensional syntactic structures in terms of Plural Reference promises not only conceptual advantages regarding the status of pluralities and the compositional semantics of three-dimensional syntactic structures, but also a unified treatment of coordination with and, which unlike the previous account need not distinguish between (non-Boolean) and expressing sum formation (for conjoined referential NPs) and and expressing logical (Boolean) conjunction.
      Plural Reference naturally provides the ‘literal’ interpretation of coordinated NPs on a three-dimensional syntactic analysis, more so than Reference to a Plurality. On a three-dimensional analysis, John and Mary will be dominated by a single NP node. Each plane contains just an ordinary singular NP (either John or Mary) whose interpretation will yield a single individual. Given Plural Reference, this already constitutes the interpretation of the entire conjoined NP, which will come out as standing for the two individuals John and Mary at once. 
     The explicit coordination John and Mary will be interpreted in the very same way as the implicit coordination in which and is absent, but John and Mary are dominated by a single NP node, namely as an NP plurally referring to John and Mary at once. The predicate will enter a single relation of predication (or theta-role assignment) to that NP so that it will apply to John and Mary at once. 
     This account can be generalized to other coordinate structures, to the effect that multiple simultaneous semantic values will be the unmarked interpretation of conjunctive coordinate structures. For example, the very same sort of interpretation can be applied to conjoined predicates dominated by a single category node, as in the child is happy and innocent. Here the coordinate predicate phrase will enter a relation of predication to an NP, which means multiple applications at once of the semantic operation of predication to the concepts expressed by happy and innocent. Similarly, the happy and innocent child will involve multiple applications of the semantic operation of intersection at once. Such multiple applications can be understood as the application of a single plural operation of predication or intersection. Again, implicitly coordinated modifiers or predicates can be interpreted in the very same way. 
    This way of extending Plural Reference to other coordinate structures is restricted to coordinate structures with conjunction and does not apply to disjunction. In fact Plural Reference itself is inapplicable to disjunction. However, there is an approach to disjunction that is equally suited for the interpretation of three-dimensional semantics, namely Alternative Semantics. Alternative Semantics is an approach that assigns several semantic values to sentences of a certain type and has been applied, in particular, to questions (Hamblin (1973), association with focus (Rooth 1985), and in fact disjunction (Aloni 2007). Related to Alternative Semantics is Truthmaker Semantics (Fine, to appear), which associates a set of truthmaking situations with the meaning of a sentence. Whereas Truthmaker Semantics associates the set of fusions of truthmakers of the conjuncts to conjunctions, it associates with disjunctions the set of situations that are exact truthmaker of either of the disjuncts).  
    Just as Plural Reference and its extension do for conjunctions, Alternative Semantics provides a literal interpretation of the three-dimensional syntactic structure of disjunctive sentences. In a way, the two approaches seem to treat conjunctions and disjunctions alike, assigning multiple semantic values to their three-dimensional syntactic structures. However, the difference will reside in the role of multiple values in the overall composition of the meaning of the sentence. Roughly, in conjunctions, the multiple semantic values will act together for the next semantic operation, plural predication or plural application of functions, for example. In disjunctions, they do not act together, but will involve pointwise application of the next semantic operation. With conjunctions, moreover, the semantic values may undergo mereological fusion of situations as is the case for conjunctions of sentences in Truthmaker Semantics or in constructions of the sort the group of John , Bill, and Mary.
   The focus of this chapter will thus be the application of Plural Reference and its generalization, as well as Alternative Semantics to the semantics of three-dimensional syntactic structures of conjunctive and disjunctive sentences. 

Structure of Chapter 3

1. Syntactic motivation for three-dimensional syntactic structures of coordination
    1.1. Syntactic motivations for three-dimensional syntactic analyses of coordination
    1.2. A three dimensional syntactic theory of coordination
2. Implicit coordination 
     2.1. The range of constructions allowing for implicitly coordinated antecedents
     2.2. Interpreting three-dimensional syntactic structures
3. Plural Reference and three-dimensional syntactic structures
     3.1. Plural reference as the literal interpretation of conjoined NPs on a three-dimensional 
            syntactic analysis
     3.2. Generalizing plural reference: plural application of semantic operations in 
            coordinate structures with conjunction
4. Alternative Semantics and the Interpretation of Disjunctions on a Three-Dimensional Syntactic Analysis
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